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Abstract
Part I introduces the Rome Statute and highlights the portions of the Rome Statute that leave
the ICC vulnerable to member states that violate the Rome Statute without any clear punishment
for the violation. In particular, Part I focuses on the expansive jurisdiction and the limited en-
forcement mechanisms that the Rome Statute bestows upon the ICC. Part II illustrates the ICC’s
vulnerability under the Rome Statute by using the example of the ICC’s indictment of President Al
Bashir and examining the existing tension between the ICC and the African Union (”AU”). Part
III argues that the ICC must strengthen or expand its enforcement mechanisms in order to become
a legitimate force in the international forum. It suggests three possible ways to reach this goal:
suspension, expulsion, and implementation of United Nations (”UN”) Security Council sanctions.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2010, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, the
President of Sudan, stepped off of an airplane and onto the soil
of Chad.' Idriss D6by, the President of Chad, welcomed him with
an embrace.' To some, the cordiality shown by the leaders was a
victory over the contentious history between the two countries.3
For the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), of which Sudan is
not a member, but Chad is, the apparent reconciliation was not a
positive development. 4
The event was concerning and significant to the ICC
because it was the first time President Al Bashir risked visiting a
member state since the ICC indicted him in 2009.5 The ICC's
1. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Informing the
United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome
Statute about President Omar Al-Bashir's Recent Visit to the Republic of Chad, at 3
(Int'l Crim. Ct. Aug. 27, 2010) (reporting that President Omar Al Bashir was in Chad
from July 21-23, 2010); see also Rebecca Hamilton, Omar Al Bashir, Fresh Off Press
Crackdown in Sudan, Defies ICC in Visit to Chad, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 21,
2010 (stating that President Al Bashir visited Chad on the same day the article was
writtenJuly 21, 2010).
2. See, e.g., jody Clarke, Chad Urged to Arrest Sudan's President, IRISH TIMES,July 23,
2010, at 9 (discussing that, upon President Al Bashir's arrival to N'Djamena, the capital
of Chad, Idriss Ddby was there to greet him); see also Visiting Sudanese Leader Hails
Reconciliation with Chad, BBC MONITORING AFRICA, July 22, 2010 (explaining that D6by
welcomed Al Bashir at the Chadian airport).
3. See Fred Oluoch, ICG Bets on a Return to Peace, E. AFR. (Nairobi), Aug. 2010
(reporting that President Al Bashir's visit to Chad gives "reason to hope that relations
[between Chad and Sudan] arc returning to normal"); see also Sudanese President Returns
from Chad Trip, SUDAN TRIBUNE, July 24, 2010 (explaining that the meeting between
Presidents Al Bashir and Dby was extraordinary because it "ended years of bitter proxy
war between the two neighbours").
4. See Interview: ICC Prosecutor May Open New Darfur Cases Next Year, SUDAN
TRIBUNE, Dec. 9, 2010 (reporting that the International Criminal Court ("ICC")
prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, noted that Kenya and Chad have a duty to arrest
President Al Bashir "irrespective of political considerations"); see also ICC Urges States to
Assist in Arresting Suspects Including Sudanese Leader, BBC MONITORING MIDDLE EAST, Oct.
30, 2010 (stating that an ICC judge expressed disappointment that the ICC has
outstanding arrest warrants, particularly referring to President Al Bashir's visit to Chad).
5. See Hamilton, supra note I (asserting that President Al Bashir's trip to Chad is his
first trip to a member state of the ICC since being indicted, in March 2009, for war
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arrest warrant for President Al Bashir was remarkable because it
is the first time the ICC indicted a head of state.6 Under the
ICC's founding treaty, the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court ("Rome Statute"), all member states have the
duty to cooperate with all ICC arrest warrants.' Therefore,
because Chad is a member state, it has the duty to arrest
President Al Bashir.8
In Chad, President Al Bashir attended a meeting of the
leaders of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States.9 President Al
Bashir remained in Chad for a total of three days.' 0 During that
time, the European Union, as well as organizations such as
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, urged Chad to
crimes and crimes against humanity); see also Summit Rejects 'All Accusations'against Beshir,
DAILY NEWS EGYPT, July 23, 2010 (noting that Chad is the first ICC member state Al
Bashir has visited since his indictment and explaining that Chad has a duty to arrest
President Al Bashir).
6. Press Release, International Criminal Court, Summary of the Decision of Prc-
Trial Chamber I on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest for Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, available at http://rav.haguefusticeportal.net/Docs/ICC/
Bashir%20Warrant%2OSummaiy.pdf [hereinafter Summary on the Prosecutor's
Application For a Warrant of Arrest] (emphasizing that this was the first time the ICC
indicted a sitting head of state).
7. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Request to All States
Parties to the Rome Statute for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al Bashir, at 5 (Mar.
6, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc642283.pdf (reminding the member
states of the ICC that they have an "obligation to comply" with the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute")); see also Clarke, supra note 2, at 9
(explaining that as a member of the ICC, Chad has an obligation to arrest President Al
Bashir).
8. See Clarke, supra note 2, at 9 (reiterating that as a member of the ICC, Chad has
an obligation to arrest President Al Bashir).
9. See Clarke, supra note 2, at 9 (declaring that President Al Bashir is in Chad to
attend a summit of the Sahel-Saharan States). The Community of Sahel-Saharan States
was established in 1998 in order to promote and achieve economic unity amongst the
member states in the Sahel-Saharan region of Arica. See Regional Economic Communities,
COMMUNITY OF SAHEL-SAHARAN STATES, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/recs/
censad.htm (last visited June 1, 2010) (describing the Community of Sahel-Saharan
States' mission statement); see also About Cen-Sad, COMMUNITY OF SAHEL SAHARAN
STATES, http://www.uneca.org/cen-sad/aboutcensad.htm# (last visited June 1, 2010)
(explaining the objectives of the Community of Sahel Saharan States).
10. Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Informing the
United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome
Statute about President Omar Al-Bashir's Recent Visit to the Republic of Chad (Aug. 27,
2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc931075.pdf (stating that President Al
Bashir went to Chad on July 21, 2010 and lefL on July 23, 2010).
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arrest President Al Bashir." Chad, however, refused.' 2
Additionally the African Union ("AU") expressed concern that
the arrest warrant would cause dissension in Africa and asked the
UN Security Council to defer the prosecution.'
The ICC enforces its arrest warrants exclusively through the
cooperation of its member states.14 Chad's refusal to arrest
President Al Bashir thus illustrates the lack of enforcement
mechanisms available to the ICC.'5 The safe travel President Al
Bashir enjoyed in Chad exemplifies the impotence of the ICC
when its member states refuse to cooperate.' 6 This Note argues
I1. See Clarke, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that the European Union foreign policy
chief asked Chad "to respect its obligations under international law to arrest and
surrender those indicted by the ICC," and that a representative from Human Rights
Watch expressed that Chad is risking the "shameful" notoriety of "harbour[ing] a
suspected war criminal" and urged Chad to arrest him); see also Claire Soares, Sudan's
Leader Defies Genocide Warrant with Trip to Old Enemy Chad, INDEP. (London), July 22,
2010, at 22 (discussing that both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch spoke
out to urge Chad to arrest President Al Bashir).
12. See Clarke, supra note 2, at 9 (asserting that Chad will not arrest President Al
Bashir because it does not believe it has an obligation to do so); see also Soares, supra
note 11, at 22 (quoting Chad's Foreign Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat as saying that
Chad's priority "is assuring peace and stability with Sudan" over complying with the
Rome Statute).
14. See African Union, Peace and Security Council 207th Meeting at the Level of the
Heads of State and Government, Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur
(AUPD), 1 242 (Oct. 29, 2009) [hereinafter AU Peace and Security Council] (explaining
that the AU asked the ICC to defer President Al Bashir's prosecution as is allowed by the
Rome Statute).
14. See Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some
Preliminary Reflections (shortened and revised version of a paper presented Nov. 4,
1998 at Rotterdam University), in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL. COURT 41, 61
(Olympia Bekou & Robert Cryer eds., 2004) (acknowledging that member state
cooperation is essential to an effective International Criminal Court); see also Silvia A.
FernAndez de Gurmendi & Hkan Friman, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Criminal Court (2001), in THE INTERNATIONAL. CRIMINAL COURT 387, 426
(Olympia Bekou & Robert Crycr eds., 2004) (arguing that the ICC "will not have powers
or resources to . . . enforce its orders directly" and thus the ICC must rely on the
cooperation of its member states).
15. SeeJeff Otieno, Sudan's President Bashir Defies Arrest Warrant, E. AFR. (Nairobi),
Aug. 2010 (contending that the ICC needs its member states' cooperation in order to
execute its indictments); see also Xan Rice Nairobi, Bashir Mars Landmark Day for Kenya,
GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 3, 2010, at II (pointing out that the ICC has no police force
and cannot arrest President Al Bashir without member state cooperation).
16. See Otieno, supra note 15 (arguing that member state cooperation is of the
utmost importance in order for the ICC to be successful); see also Nairobi, supra note 15,
at II (explaining that the ICC cannot arrest President Al Bashir without the cooperation
of ICC member states).
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that due to these vulnerabilities, the ICC must strengthen its
enforcement mechanisms.
Part I introduces the Rome Statute and highlights the
portions of the Rome Statute that leave the ICC vulnerable to
member states that violate the Rome Statute without any clear
punishment for the violation. In particular, Part I focuses on the
expansive jurisdiction and the limited enforcement mechanisms
that the Rome Statute bestows upon the ICC. Part II illustrates
the ICC's vulnerability under the Rome Statute by using the
example of the ICC's indictment of President Al Bashir and
examining the existing tension between the ICC and the African
Union ("AU"). Part III argues that the ICC must strengthen or
expand its enforcement mechanisms in order to become a
legitimate force in the international forum. It suggests three
possible ways to reach this goal: suspension, expulsion, and
implementation of United Nations ("UN") Security Council
sanctions.
I. THE ICC AND THE ROME STATUTE
The ICC is a permanent international court that prosecutes
individuals accused of committing serious crimes at an
international level.17 The ICC was founded in 2002 upon the
enactment of the Rome Statute.'8 The Rome Statute exposes the
ICC to vulnerabilities that cause its enforcement mechanisms to
be largely ineffective in the event of a member state breach. Part
I.A. details the ICC's purpose and structure. Parts I.A.1. and
I.A.2. explains the crimes that are punishable under the Rome
Statute and briefly discusses who may be prosecuted. Part I.A.3.,
then, explores the ICC's jurisdiction and the different ways in
which the ICC can prosecute individuals. The possible
repercussions facing a member state that breaches the Rome
Statute are discussed in Part I.B.I. The enforcement mechanisms
of other organizations and tribunals are identified in Part I.B.2.
Next, in Part I.B.3., the circumstances that allow a member state
to be immune or excused from cooperating with the Rome
Statute are outlined. Part I.C. introduces the role of the ICC
17. See infra Part L.A. (discussing the history of the ICC and the crimes that the ICC
hasjurisdiction over).
18. See infra Part L.A. (explaining that the Rome Statute is the ICC's founding
document and that the ICC is a permanent international court).
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prosecutor and the option to defer a prosecution. Finally, Part
I.D. presents the possibility and process of amending the Rome
Statute.
A. Background
The Rome Statute, the ICC's founding document, entered
into force on July 1, 2002.'9 The creation of the ICC was inspired
by the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda ("ICTR")
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY"). These were temporary tribunals established
in response to atrocities committed in those countries.20 The ICC
was founded because both the ICTR and ICTY "were established
to try crimes committed only within a specific time-frame and
during a specific conflict," and therefore, a permanent criminal
court was needed.2' Currently 114 states are ICC members.22
Fifteen are Asian states; eighteen are Eastern European; twenty-
five are Latin American and Caribbean states; twenty-five are
Western European and other states; and thirty-one are from
Africa, making Africa the region with the most member states.23
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (asserting that "an International Criminal Court
... is hereby established" and "[t]he jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be
governed by the provisions of this Statute").
20. See About the Court, INTERNATIONAL. CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/
Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (last visited June 1, 2011) (describing the history of the
ICC); see also About ICTR, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/Gcenerallnformation/tabid/101/)efatilt.aspx (last
visited June 1, 2011) (noting that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was
created to prosecute those "responsible for genocide and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between I January
1994 and 31 December 1994"); see also About the ICT, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/
sections/AboutthelCTY (last visited June 1, 2011) (describing the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") as a court "dealing with war crimes that
took place during the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990's").
21. See About the Court, INTERNATIONAL. CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 20.
22. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icccpi.int/Mentis/ASP/states+partics/ (last visited June 1, 2011) (listing
each of the 114 member states).
23. See Africa (Sub-Saharan), COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=region&idureg=l (last visited June 1, 2011) (reporting
that thirty-one African countries ratified the Rome Statute making it the ICC's "most
represented region"); The States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 22 (listing each
member state and breaking them down by region).
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1. Punishable Crimes
The purposes of the ICC are to punish the most serious
crimes committed at an international level and to bring
individual perpetrators to justice.24 The ICC has jurisdiction over
four categories of crimes: 1) the crime of genocide; 2) crimes
against humanity; 3) war crimes; and 4) the crime of
aggression.25 Under the Rome Statute, genocide is the
commission of an act done with the "intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." 26
The Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as any of
a list of identified acts when "committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack."27 Additionally, in one of the longest
articles, it defines war crimes as crimes "committed as part of a
plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such
crimes."28 The Rome Statute then identifies war crimes more
specifically, such as "wilful [sic] killing" and "torture or inhuman
treatment."29 The ICC has not yet exercised jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression because the crime was not defined until May
2010 at the ICC Review Conference.30 The ICC will not exercise
24. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 1, (pointing out that the ICC has the
ability to punish individuals that have "committed the most serious crimes of
international concern"); see also Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09,
Decision on the Prosecution's Application lor a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, at 15 (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc639096.pdf (reporting that one of the Rome Statute's main goals is to stop
individuals from committing the most serious crimes that affect the international
community).
25. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 5 (listing the crimes over which the ICC
hasijurisdiction).
26. Id. art. 6. The Rome Statute specifies five acts that an individual engages in to
bring about genocide:
"(a) [k]illing members of the group;(b) [c]ausing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; (c) [d]cliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part; (d)[ijmposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
and (e) [florcibly transferring children of the group to another group."
Id.
27. Id. art. 7, at 3-4.
28. Id. art. 8(1) at 5.
29. Id. art. 8(2)(a)(i-ii).
30. See id. art. 5, at 3 (listing the crimes that the ICC has jurisdiction over and
stating that the ICC "shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted" and the crime is defined); see also Cassese, supra note 14, at 44
(noting that defining aggression is very diflicult because it necessitates a decision
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jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until 2017 when the
member states will have an opportunity to expand the ICC's
jurisdiction through an amendment to the Rome Statute.3
2. Individual Culpability
The ICC prosecutes individuals, not states, including
government officials and heads of states. 32 The Rome Statute,
however, does not specify whether a charged individual's status as
a head of state is irrelevant only when he is a head of a member
state or if it applies to all indicted heads of state.33 The ICC has
jurisdiction over individuals who commit crimes directly or
indirectly.34 It is sufficient that the individual solicits or induces
the commission of the crime or that the individual commits the
crime through or with another person, even if that other person
is not criminally responsible.35
3. ICC's Jurisdiction
In order to exercise jurisdiction over an individual, the
putative crime must be referred to the ICC in one of three ways:
1) the member state in which the crime occurs refers it to the
ICC prosecutor; 2) the UN Security Council refers the crime to
whether preemptive self-defense is lawful tinder the Rome Statute and because any list of
crimes of aggression is likely to be incomplete); see also COALITION FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression (last visited
June 1, 2011) (announcing that the ICC Review Conference of 2010 defined
aggression).
31. See COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 30
(reporting that the ICC will not be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression until January 1, 2017, when a decision is made by the member states to
activate the jurisdiction and amend the Rome Statute).
32. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 25, at 17-18 (asserting that the ICC has
jurisdiction over "natural persons" and "[a] person who commits a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment");
see also Kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 147, 153 (Olympia Bekou & Robert Cryer eds., 2004)
(concluding that the ICC's jurisdictional focus is on individuals); see also Dapo Akande,
The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis
and Limits, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 225, 247 (Olympia Bekou & Robert
Cryer eds., 2004) (observing that the ICC has jurisdiction over state officials).
33. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 27, at 18 (specifying that the Rome Statute
applies "equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity").
34. Id. art. 25 at 17-18 (setting forth individual criminal responsibility).
35. Id. (explaining individual responsibility when the individual did not explicitly
commit the crime himself).
1592 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:1584
the ICC prosecutor; or 3) the ICC prosecutor himself initiates
the investigation.36 The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes that take
place in a member state's territory or a crime that is committed
by a national of a member state in any territory.37 Thus, member
states consent to the powers of the ICC.38 Through this consent,
the ICC virtually steps into the shoes of the national government
and acquires its power. 9 The ICC cannot prosecute an
individual, however, if the member state is already prosecuting
said person. 40 The ICC will only prosecute when the member
state is "unwilling" or "unable" to prosecute the individual
itself.41 If the individual is from a non-member state, the non-
member state may agree to the jurisdiction of the ICC and
surrender that individual.42
In special circumstances, the ICC can have jurisdiction over
an individual who does not meet any of the above criteria, and
those circumstances involve the relationship between the UN and
36. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 13, at 11 (listing the three instances in which
the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction); see Cassese, supra note 14, at 58-59 (stating in
detail the three-pronged test that regulates the prosecutor's jurisdiction).
37. Rome Statute, supra note 19, at 11 (explaining that the ICC may exercise
jurisdiction over nationals of member states and non-nationals that commit crimes in
member states); see Dapo Akande, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over
Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits (2001), in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 225-26, 618-19(Olympia Bekou & Robert Cryer eds., 2004) (stating the
jurisdiction of the ICC).
38. See Hans-Peter Kaul & Claus KreB, Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute
of the International Criminal Court: Principles and Compromises (1999), in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 191, 205 (Olympia Bekou & Robert Cryer eds., 2004)
(arguing that cooperation of the ICC's member states "goes to the heart of an effective
Court" because without cooperation, the ICC is left powerless); see also Cassese, supra
note 14, at 61 (emphasizing that state cooperation is imminently important to the
success of the ICC).
39. Rome Statute, supra note 19, at 11 (describing situations in which the ICC may
exercise its jurisdiction); see Akande, supra note 37, at 225-26, 618-19 (explaining the
jurisdiction of the ICC).
40. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 17, at 11 (declaring that the ICC may not
investigate or prosecute a case that is "being investigated or prosecuted by a State which
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution." This concept is known as complemetarity); see Akande,
supra note 37, at 263-66, 671-74 (examining the process of complementarity in the
Rome Statute).
41. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
42. Rome Statute, supra note 19, at I (identifying situations in which the ICC may
exercise its jurisdiction); see Akande, supra note 37, at 226, 619 (explaining the
jurisdiction of the ICC).
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the ICC.43 The ICC is independent from the UN, but the two
bodies cooperate. 44 More specifically, the UN and the ICC have a
Relationship Agreement.45 Additionally, the UN and the ICC
"recognize each other's mandates and status and agree to
cooperate and consult with each other on matters of mutual
interest." 6 Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations ("UN Charter"), the UN makes determinations of
threats to peace on an international level and recommends or
decides what measures shall be taken concerning that threat.47 In
conjunction with the Rome Statute and the Relationship
Agreement, the UN Security Council may refer a breach of
international peace, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, to the ICC.48 The UN Security Council may refer a
situation to the ICC even if it involves a national of a non-
member state.49
B. Duty to Cooperate
Member states are required to cooperate with the ICC in its
investigations and prosecutions.50 If a member state does not
43. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 13, at II (explaining that the prosecutor may
investigate and exercise jurisdiction if the United Nations ("UN") Security Council
referred the situation to him); see Kaul & KrcB, supra note 38, at 68, 162 (indicating that
after much debate over many jurisdictional elements, the final decision was to have
jurisdiction over situations referred by the UN Security Council).
44. Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the International
Criminal Court, Oct. 4, 2004, U.N. Doc. A/58/874, arts. 2, 3 [hereinafter Relationship
Agreement] (recognizing that although the ICC is independent, the ICC and the UN
cooperate).
45. Rome Statute, supra note 19, at 2 (initiating the relationship between the ICC
and the UN).
46. Questions and Answers on the International Criminal Court, COALITION FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 4 (2005), http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/
documents/FS ICCQA.pdf.
47. U.N. Charter art. 39 (asserting that the UN Security Council "shall determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken"); Relationship
Agreement, supra note 44, at art. 17(1) (establishing that the UN Security Council refers
situations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to the ICC).
48. U.N. Charter art. 39, supra note 47; Relationship Agreement, supra note 44, at
art. 17(1) (describing how the UN Security Council refers situations to the ICC).
49. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 13, at 11 (articulating that the UN Security
Council may refer a situation to the ICC).
50. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 86-87, at 60 (asserting that member states
must "cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes
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cooperate, however, the Rome Statute does not contain a specific
repercussion for the offending member.5' Other organizations,
on the other hand, do have specific repercussions listed in their
founding documents. 52 An added source of confusion, beyond
the lack of repercussions for member states that do not
cooperate, is the unclear nature of immunity or excusal from
cooperation for the member states.53
1. ICC Duty to Cooperate
The ICC may request the arrest and surrender of an
individual to the ICC.54 When the ICC decides to indict an
individual, it may issue a request to a member state or states,
specifying the manner in which the member state is expected to
cooperate.55 It will then coordinate with the member state in
order to transport the individual from that state to the ICC,
which is located in The Hague, Netherlands.56 If an individual is
convicted, then the Trial Chamber sentences him.57 The Trial
Chamber can imprison a convicted criminal for up to thirty years
in jail or, when justified by the gravity of the crime, a life
sentence.58
within the jurisdiction of the Court" and that the ICC may make specific requests to the
member states asking for cooperation).
51. See infra Part B.I. (highlighting that the Rome Statute is almost completely
silent in regards to the repercussions of a member state that refuses to comply with the
Rome Statute).
52. See infra Part B.2. (using examples to describe organizations that do have
specific repercussions for member states that do not cooperate with the founding
document).
53. See infra Part 1.3. (explaining the confusing nature of the immunity or excusal
from cooperation clause of the Rome Statute).
54. See id. (explaining the process for arrest and surrender of an individual to the
ICC).
55. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 89(l), at 61 (indicating that the ICC may
request a member state to arrest and surrender an individual that enters its territory).
56. See id. art. 89(3), at 61 (describing the logistics of transporting an individual
from a state to the ICC).
57. See id. art. 76(1), at 53 (setting out the process of sentencing a convicted
individual). The Trial Chamber is a division of the ICC that is assigned to the Trial
Division of the ICC (as opposed to the Appeals Division or the Pre-Trial Division) and is
composed of "not less than six judges" who are assigned "based on the nature of the
functions to be performed . . . ." Id. art. 39(1), at 26.
58. See id. art. 77(l), at 54 (specifying the choices the ICC has when sentencing a
convicted individual); see Marlise Simons, For International Criminal Court, Frustration and
Missteps in Its First Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2010, at A12 (citing that the ICC "has all
the trappings of a weighty institution: 18 judges, a large corps of prosecutors, a
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If a member state fails to cooperate, however, the Rome
Statute is largely silent on the repercussions: when a member
state does not cooperate with a request from the ICC, the ICC
can "refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where
the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the
Security Council."59 The Relationship Agreement reiterates this
concept.60 It explains that when the UN Security Council
originally referred a matter to the ICC, the ICC shall refer the
member state's failure to cooperate with the ICC, back to the UN
Security Council.6'
2. A Comparative Approach: Duty to Cooperate under Other
Organizations and Tribunals
While the Rome Statute is largely silent concerning
repercussions for violations, other international organizations
have more definite options regarding violations.62 The
Organization of American States ("OAS") was established to
achieve among its members "an order of peace and justice, to
promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to
defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their
independence."6 1 On June 28, 2009, a military-backed coup
removed the President of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, from
office. 64 The OAS suspended Honduras' membership for
multimillion-dollar budget and its own prison cells" for prisoners detained during trial).
Additionally, the Trial Chamber may order the convicted criminal to pay a fine or forfeit
proceeds, property, or assets if those gains were acquired through the crime. See Rome
Statute, supra note 19, art. 77(2), at 54 (elucidating the circumstances under which the
Trial Chamber can impose fines upon an individual).
59. Id. art. 87(7), at 61; see Kaul & KreB, supra note 38, at 217 (arguing that
although the Rome Statute gives the ICC the ability to refer to the UN Security Council,
there is no "explicit solution" described in the Rome Statute).
60. See Relationship Agreement, supra note 44, art. 17(3), at 201 (mentioning that
the ICC shall refer a breach to the UN Security Council when that situation was
originally referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council).
61. See id. (describing the process the ICC goes through to refer a breach of the
Rome Statute to the UN Security Council).
62. See infra notes 66, 70 (pointing out organizations that use specific means to
force their member states to cooperate).
63. Charter of the Organization of American States (A-41) art. 1, Apr. 30, 1948, 119
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OAS Charter].
64. See Hannah Strange, Honduras President Manuel Zelaya Ousted in Military Coup,
TIMES (London), June 29, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
usandamericas/article6596689.ece.
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interrupting the democratic order,65 which is a violation of the
Charter of the Organization of American States ("OAS
Charter").66 In order to be suspended, two-thirds of the members
must vote affirmatively.67 While on suspension, Honduras still has
a duty to uphold the OAS Charter.68 The suspension may be
lifted "by a decision adopted with the approval of two-thirds of
the Member States."69
This process is comparable to the UN Charter which allows
for "expulsion for persistent violations of the principles of the
Charter," even though no member state has been expelled since
its inception in 1945.70 The UN allows for suspension first "upon
the recommendation" of the UN Security Council and if the
principles in the Charter are continuously violated, the UN has
the ability to expel a member.71 In order to expel a member state
there must be a two-thirds majority vote and if any UN Security
Council member vetoes the expulsion, the member state cannot
be expelled.72
65. See OAS Charter, supra note 63, art. 2 (asserting that member states will
"promote and consolidate representative democracy"); see also Press Release, Org. of
Am. States, OAS Suspends Membership of Hond., E-219/09, (July 5, 2009) [hereinafter
OAS Suspends Honduras] (describing the coup in Honduras and explaining that the
country is in violation of its duty to maintain a democratic country).
66. See OAS Charter, supra note 63, art. 2; see also OAS Suspends Honduras, supra
note 65 (explaining that Honduras was suspended for failing to maintain a democracy
and for ousting a democratic government).
67. See OAS Charter, supra note 63, art. 9 (describing the process of the decision to
suspend a member state and asserting that two-thirds of the member states must vote
affirmatively in order for a member state to be suspended).
68. See id. (stating that the suspended member state "shall continue to fulfill its
obligations to the Organization").
69. Id.
70. See BoWETT's LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 549-51 (Phillippe Sands &
Pierre Klein eds., 5th ed. 2001) (explaining that a UN member state may be expelled
and implying that it has not yet happened).
71. UN Charter, supra note 47, arts. 5, 6.
72. See id. art. 18 (the decision to expel is an important decision and it thus
requires a two-thirds majority vote); see also JAN KIABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 109 (2d ed. 2002) (setting out the UN's ability to
decide to expel a member state and explaining just how difficult it is to actually expel a
member state because once the member state is expelled, the UN no longer has control
over that state).
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3. Immunity or Excusal from Cooperating under the Rome
Statute
While the ICC member states are required to cooperate with
the ICC in its investigations and prosecutions, under Article 98 of
the Rome Statute, there are circumstances in which ICC member
states are either immune or excused from cooperation.73 Under
Article 98(1), member states are not permitted to cooperate with
the ICC if the member state has an international obligation or
contract that conflicts with its duties under the Rome Statute in
regards to the "State or diplomatic immunity of a person or
property of a third State." 74 If the immunity is waived, however,
the ICC may continue its prosecution.75 Under international law,
immunity ratione personae excuses officials of acts they commit
and it applies to very few individuals, including heads of state,
and lasts as long as the official is in office.76 Another argument is
that ratione personae does not apply to core crimes such as those
covered under the Rome Statute.77
Under Article 98(2), the member state also does not have to
cooperate if it has a binding international agreement with
another state and cooperation would cause the member state to
breach that agreement.78 Article 98(2) was generally adopted so
that member states that had status-of-forces agreements
("SOFAs") would sign the Rome Statute and would not be in
breach of their duty to cooperate with the ICC.7 9 SOFAs are
73. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 98 (defining cooperation "with respect to
waiver of immunity and consent to surrender").
74. Id. art. 98(1) (explaining cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and
consent to surrender).
75. See id.
76. See Steffen Wirth, Immunities, Related Problems, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute
(2001), in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 329, 332 (Olympia Bekou & Robert
Cryer eds., 2004) (describing the absolute immunity heads of states enjoy while in
office); see also Akande, supra note 32, at 248-49 (clarifying ratione personae).
77. See Wirth, supra note 76, at 333 (pointing out that, in the past, core crimes,
such as those in the ICC, were found to be not covered tinder the ratione personae
immunity).
78. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 98(2) (explaining thata member state may
not be requested to "act inconsistently with its obligations under international law").
79. See Akande, supra note 32, at 251 (clarifying that Article 98(2) was not adopted
to allow member states to shirk their responsibilities under the Rome Statute).
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agreements establishing rights and privileges of foreign military
personnel present in a host country.80
C. The Role of the Prosecutor
The ICC is composed of the 1) Presidency, 2) Judges (the
Pre-Trial Division, the Trial Division, and the Appeals Division),
3) Office of the Prosecutor, and 4) Registry.8' The Office of the
Prosecutor is separate from the other three organs of the ICC,
and is headed by the prosecutor.8 2 The prosecutor is elected by
an "absolute majority" of the Assembly of States Parties,
comprised of one representative from each member state,
through a secret ballot.83 The prosecutor's main function is to
conduct investigations and prosecutions.84 On a request from the
prosecutor, the Pre-Trial Chamber may issue an arrest warrant or
a summons to appear upon an individual if there is reason to
believe that he committed the crime.85 The prosecutor may, at a
later time, request to amend the arrest warrant.86 The prosecutor
is independent from the ICC and does not need authorization
from the Assembly of States Parties before initiating an
investigation.87 There is some concern that the prosecutor has
80. See Military, Statusof-Forces Agreement [SOFA], GLOBAL SECURiTY http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sofa.htm (last visited June 1, 2011) (presenting the
function and purpose of Status-of-Forces Agreements).
81. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 34, (listing the four organs of the ICC).
82. See id. art. 42(1) ("The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a
separate organ of the Court"); see also Cassese, supra note 14, at 58 (discussing the
contentious struggle that decided whether the prosecutor should have the ability to be
independent).
83. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 42(4) ("The [pirosecutor shall be elected
by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the members of the Assembly of States
Parties."); id. art. 112(1) (defining the Assembly of States Parties, the makeup of the
Assembly, and its role).
84. See id. art. 42(1), at 27 (asserting that the prosecutor "is "responsible for
receiving referrals and any substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court, for examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions
before the Court").
85. Id. art. 58(l) (discussing that "the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the application
of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest of a person if, having examined the
application and the evidence or other information submitted by the Prosecutor, it is
satisfied" that the individual committed the crime and his arrest is necessary).
86. Id. art. 58(6) ("The Prosecutor may request the Pre-Trial Chamber to amend
the warrant of arrest by modifying or adding to the crimes specified therein.").
87. SeeJohn R. Bolton, The Risks and the Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court
from America's Perspective, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 459, 461-62 (Olympia
Bekou & Robert Cryer eds., 2004) (explaining the United States' reluctance to sign the
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too much power and that, depending on who becomes the
prosecutor, unsupervised power could prove dangerous.88
The Rome Statute includes an option to defer the
prosecution for twelve months, which begins once the request to
defer is made.89 In order to defer, the UN Security Council must
issue a request to the ICC.90 Once the UN Security Council has
requested the deferral, the ICC must comply."' The deferral may
be continuously renewed every twelve months through requests
from the UN Security Council.92
D. Amending the Rome Statute.
The Rome Statute may be amended. In order to amend the
Rome Statute, the amendment must be proposed by either a
member state, the judges acting by an absolute majority, or the
prosecutor.93 The amendments are adopted by a two-thirds
majority vote of the Assembly of States Parties. 94 The Assembly of
States Parties will vote on the proposal at the next meeting as
long as it occurs at least three months after the amendment was
Rome Statute because the prosecutor has no political accountability); see also William A.
Schabas, International Criminal Court: The Secret of its Success, in THE LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 69, 79 (Olympia Bekou &
Robert Cryer eds., 2004) (arguing that the prosecutor has to be politically savvy in
determining which cases to bring before the ICC).
88. See Schabas, supra note 87, at 79-80 (examining the political nature of the ICC
prosecutor's position).
89. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 16 (providing for a twelve-month deferral
upon request from the UN Security Council).
90. See id.
91. See Relationship Agreement, supra note 44, art. 17(2) (setting forth the deferral
process and explaining that the ICC must comply with the deferral once it is requested).
92. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 16 (noting that, if the Security Council
defers an investigation, the prosecutor may not investigate or prosecute for twelve
months); see also Akande, supra note 32, at 253-54 (describing the process of deferral
and arguing that the existence of this process could persuade states to seek
authorization from the UN Security Council before commencing military action).
93. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 121(1) (granting member states the ability
to propose amendments).
94. See id., art. 121(3) ("The adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the
Assembly of States Parties or at a Review Conference on which consensus cannot be
reached shall require a two-thirds majority of States Parties.").
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proposed.95 The Assembly of States Parties meets once a year
and, when necessary, it also holds special sessions.96
In summary, the Rome Statute creates a jurisdiction that
allows the ICC to indict any person that is referred to the
prosecutor by the UN Security Council. It is, however, only
capable of arresting individuals through the help of the ICC
member states. Therefore, in order to arrest an indicted
individual who is not a national of a member state, the indicted
person must travel to a member state.
The member state then has an obligation to arrest him
under the Rome Statute. If the member state fails to comply with
the Rome Statute, the recourse for the ICC is unclear. The ICC
may refer the matter to the UN Security Council. Beyond that
option, however, the Rome Statute is silent on the matter.
The Rome Statute has two further problematic provisions.
The first is that it specifies that a head of state is not immune
from prosecution but it does not specify whether this applies only
to nationals of member states or if it applies to all indicted
individuals, such as heads of states who are not members.
Additionally, although the Rome Statute specifies that heads of
states do not have immunity, it also states that there is diplomatic
immunity, which could be read as meaning heads of state.
The second is the possibility to have immunity or an excusal
from cooperation because of an existing agreement with a third
party. The Rome Statute, however, does not at all specify what
type of agreement justifies a breach. Therefore, it is not clear
under what circumstances a member state has breached the
Rome Statute and under what circumstances the member state is
excused or the individual is immune. Additionally, while there is
a process to amend confusing provisions such as those
mentioned above, it has only happened once in the history of the
ICC.
95. See id. art. 121(2), at 79 ("No sooner than three months from the date of
notification, the Assembly of States Parties, at its next meeting, shall, by a majority of
those present and voting, decide whether to take up the proposal.").
96. See id. art. 112(6) (specifying the Assembly of States Parties' frequency of
meetings).
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II. AN EXAMPLE: THE ICC'S INDICTMENT OF PRESIDENT
OMAR AL BASHIR
The weaknesses that exist in the Rome Statute, presented in
Part I, are exemplified in the case study of the ICC's indictment
of President Al Bashir. Part II.A. explains the process of the
indictment. Part II.B. then describes the history of Sudan and the
conflict in Darfur that led to President Al-Bashir's indictment.
Part II.C. discusses government and multinational organizational
responses to President Al Bashir's indictment. Part II.D., in
comparison, explores the AU's concern over the indictment and
the refusal of Chad and Kenya to arrest him.
A. Indictment of President Al Bashir
On March 31, 2005, the UN Security Council referred the
situation regarding Sudan, a non-member state of the ICC, to the
ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, pursuant to Article 13(b)
of the Rome Statute.97 On June 1, 2005, the prosecutor elected to
investigate the situation in accordance with Article 53 of the
Rome Statute.98 After investigating, Moreno-Ocampo requested
arrest warrants for six individuals involved in the Darfur
situation, including President Al Bashir.99 Out of the six, five
individuals were indicted. 00 Two of the five appeared at The
Hague voluntarily, the other three remain at large.10
On July 14, 2008, Moreno-Ocampo requested an arrest
warrant for President Al Bashir for genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes against members of the Fur, Masalit,
and Zaghawa groups from 2003 to 2008.102 President Al Bashir
97. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, I 1 (March 4, 2009), http://www.ice-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf
(reporting that on March 31, 2005, the UN Security Council referred the matter in
Darfur to the Prosecutor of the ICC).
98. See id. 1 3 (stating that the prosecutor informed the Chamber that it intended
to initiate an investigation into the Darfur situation).
99. See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/
situation%20icc%200205 (last visited June 1, 2011) (listing the individuals that were
indicted in relation to Darfur, Sudan).
100. See id. (reporting that warrants of arrest were issued to all six of the men).
101. See id. (indicating the status of each of the indicted men).
102. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
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was indicted on March 4, 2009 as an indirect perpetrator.103 The
ICC found that there was enough evidence that President Al
Bashir used the Sudanese military as well as Sudan's Government
to carry out criminal activity.104 He was indicted for committing
five counts of crimes against humanity105 and two counts of war
crimes; 106 however, the ICC did not find that enough evidence
existed to indict him for genocide.107 Notably, this was the first
time that the ICC issued an arrest warrant for a sitting head of
state.10
On March 5, 2009, the ICC requested that Sudan arrest and
surrender President Al Bashir. 109 The next day, pursuant to
Article 89(1) of the Rome Statute, the ICC requested that
member states arrest and surrender President Al Bashir if
presented with the opportunity to do so.110
Bashir, 4 (March 4, 2009) (noting that Moreno-Ocampo filed this request under
Article 58 of the Rome Statute).
103. See id. at 11 92-93 (announcing the ICC's decision to indict President Al
Bashir).
104. See id. at 15 55-109 (examining the history leading up to President Al Bashir's
indictment).
105. Id. at 92. Specifically, President Al Bashir was indicted for 1) murder, 2)
extermination, 3) forcible transfer, 4) torture and 5) rape under Article 7, which defines
crimes against humanity. Id.
106. See id. President Al Bashir was indicted under Article 8 for 1) intentionally
directing attacks against the civilian population or against individual civilians not taking
direct part in hostilities, and 2) pillaging. Id. (stating the crimes that the ICC found that
enough evidence existed to indict President Al Bashir).
107. See id. at 206-07 (holding that there is not enough evidence to indict
President Al Bashir for genocide, but the prosecutor may amend the request pursuant to
Article 58(6) of the Rome Statute if he finds more evidence).
108. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Summary of the Decision of
Pre-Trial Chamber I on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest for Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, available at http://www.hagucjusticeportal.net/Docs/ICC/
Bashir%20Warrant%20Summary.pdf (pointing out that this is the first time the ICC has
indicted a sitting head of state).
109. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Request to the
Republic of the Sudan for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al Bashir, at 4 (Mar. 5,
2009), http://212.159.242.180/iccdocs/doc/doc639772.pdf (requesting that Sudan, in
accordance with its duties as a member of the UN, surrender President Al Bashir
pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1593).
110. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Request to All States
Parties to the Rome Statute for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al Bashir, at 3-4
(Mar. 6, 2009), available at http://212.159.242.180/iccdocs/doc/doc642283.pdf (asking
that all member states participate in the arrest and prosecution of President Al Bashir).
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B. Background on President Al Bashir's Indictment: the Conflict in
Darfur
President Al Bashir came to power in Sudan in 1989 after
leading a military coup that overthrew the former Sudanese
Government."' In early 2003, a conflict emerged in the Darfur
region when the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army
("SLM/A") and the Justice and Equality Movement ("JEM")
attacked the El Fasher airport as an act against the Sudanese
Government." 2 In response, the Sudan People's Armed Forces
and their militia the Janjaweed Militia, the Sudanese Police
Forces, the National Intelligence and Security Service, and the
Humanitarian Aid Commission led a counter-insurgency against
the SLM/A, the JEM, and other armed groups opposing the
Government of Sudan, President Al Bashir's Government." 3 The
groups opposed to President Al Bashir were mostly composed of
individuals from the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes."4
Although the conflict formally began in 2003, the problems
started much earlier. Darfur was once independent but became a
part of what was then British Sudan in 1917."5 The integration
led "to the economic and political marginalisation of
Ill. See Howard LaFranchi, New Violence in Sudan, Darfur One Year after the
Indictment of Bashir, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 4, 2010 (stating that President Al
Bashir came to power through a 1989 coup where he overthrew Sadiq Al Mahdi); see also
The Darfur Dilemma, CANBERRA TIMES (Canberra, Austl.), june 8, 2009 (asserting that
President Al Bashir was a former army general who seized power in a 1989 coup).
112. See Summary on the Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, supra
note 6 (explaining that the Justice and Equality Movement (",JEM") and the Sudanese
Liberation Movement/Army ("SLM/A") started to resort to violence in 2002 and then
in April 2003 attacked the El Fasher airport); see also African Union, Peace and Security
Council 207th Meeting at the Level of the Heads of State and Government, Report of the
African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), 93 (Oct. 29, 2009) [hereinafter AU
P'eace and Security Council] (describing the rebel attack on El Fasher airport).
113. AU Peace and Security Council, supra note 112, at 21 (Oct. 29, 2009)
(explicating the counter-insurgency by Al Bashir's Government against the rebel
groups); see also id. at xiv (describing the counter-insurgency by the Sudanese military
and militia groups).
114. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, 1 56 (March 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf
(noting that the Sudanese Government's forces attacked towns and villages inhabited by
the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups).
115. See AU Peace and Security Council, supra note 112, 1 47 (Oct. 29, 2009)
(asserting that Darfur was the "last independent territory in Africa to he annexed by the
British, on 1 January 1917").
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Darfurians."116 The airport attack was a response to historic
marginalization that has been continued by current and recent
governments." 7 For example, in 1980, the government
appointed a non-Darfurian to be the governor of Darfur, causing
the Darfurians to fear that their interests would not be
represented.'18 Then, in 1994, President Al Bashir divided Darfur
into three states, rendering the Fur tribe minorities in each
territory.119 In 1995, the governor of Darfur enacted a reform
that shifted the power of the electoral college in West Darfur so
the majority were non-Masalits.120 Significantly, this change gave
the Masalits' majority position to non-Masalits, which made it
possible for a non-Masalit to become the Sultan of Dar-Masalit
and for other tribes to exert more power over the Masalit tribe's
land. '2
Once the war started, the military, backed by President Al
Bashir's Government, burned hundreds of villages and displaced
over one million people. 2 2 The UN estimates the death toll to be
about 300,000 individuals.'2 3 Some sources report that a
minimum of 35,000 civilians were killed between 2003 and 2004
116. See id. 155.
117. See id. 11 49-54 (establishing the historical marginalization that the rebel
groups felt and their frustration which led to the attacks).
118. See id. 1 19 (describing the protest that followed the appointment of an
outsider to office).
119. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09,
Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, 166 (March 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc639096.pdf (setting forth that President Al Bashir issued a decree in 1994 that split
up the three states, making the Fur a minority in each state). The Fur is an ethnic group
in the Darfur region of western Sudan, indeed "Darfur" means "the domain of the fur."
See AU Peace and Security Council, supra note 112, 11 42-43 (Oct. 29, 2009).
120. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09,
Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, 1 166 (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.
pdf (setting out that President Al Bashir issued a decree in 1994 that split up the three
states, making the Fur a minority in each state).
121. See id. (outlining the actions of Governor Muhammad Ahmad Al Fadul that
led to a conflict and years of fighting before the attack on El Fasher airport); see also AU
Peace and Security Council, supra note 112, at 20 (Oct. 29, 2009) (describing the
conflict in 1995 and reporting the backlash of the change in the electoral college).
122. See AU Peace and Security Council, supra note 112, 1 94 (describing the
conflict between President Al Bashir's Government and the rebels).
123. See id. 1 95 (reporting estimates of the displacements' death toll in Darfur).
2011] ICC INEFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 1605
alone. 124 There was a ceasefire in April 2004 but violence broke
out again between June 2004 and January 2005.125 Since then, the
violence has subsided, although the problems are still present. 26
C. Response to Al Bashir's Indictment
From January 9 to January 15, 2011, there was a referendum
in Sudan to determine whether Southern Sudan, which does not
include Darfur, will secede from the rest of the country.'27 The
results were released on February 7, 2011, with almost ninety-
nine percent voting for independence.' 28 On July 9, 2011,
Southern Sudan became an independent country. 29
Despite the independence and referendum's ultimate
success, there was anticipation and fear that a civil war would
break out. 30 There is now concern regarding the resulting
government's ability to effectively rule, and there remains some
concern that North Sudan will provoke fighting.'3'
Given the precarious nature of peace in Sudan, President Al
Bashir's indictment was met with some criticism internationally
124. See id. (establishing that the majority of civilian deaths were committed by
President Al Bashir's Government).
125. See id. 1 96 (observing that there was a brief cease fire in Darfur but the
violence resumed shortly thereafter).
126. See id. 1 9 ("Because of the breakdown of law and order, characterised by
banditry, and fueled by the free flow of weapons within the community, weak formal
policing, and the ineffectiveness of local governance structures, the problems still
persist.").
127. See Alex Thurston, Some Optimism about Sudan Referendum after Months of Doubts,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 4, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-
Monitor/2O11/0104/Some-optimism-about-Sudan-referendum-after-months-of-doubts (describing
the concern regarding the upcoming referendum); see also Ali Shuaib & Christian Lowe,
EU and Africa Urge Peaceful Sudan Referendum, REUTERS (Nov. 30, 2010), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2010/1l1/30/us-cu-africa-summit-draft-
idUSTRE6AT3EI20101130 (discussing the upcoming referendum).
128. See josh Kron, Sudan Leader to Accept Secession of South, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2011,
at A7 ("98.83 percent of the more than 3.8 million registered voters in southern Sudan
chose to separate from the north.").
129. See Juba Accuses Khartoum of Blocking Trade Routes, AFP (stating that South
Sudan became a new country on July 9, 2011).
130. See Thurston, supra note 127 (expressing the relief of officials that the
likelihood of another civil war is diminishing); see also Shuaib & Lowe, supra note 127
(explaining that the referendum could result in conflict).
131. See Thurston, supra note 127 (describing concern with the outcome of the
referendum).
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by the AU, China, and others.'32 One reason for the criticism is
that there was fear the indictment would cause the government
to be less likely to cooperate with peace agreements. 33 Although
the referendum and independence succeeded, there was
extreme concern that the arrest warrant would hinder the
progress.'34 A second concern over the indictment is that the ICC
indicted a head of state, which interferes with Sudan's national
sovereignty.133 Under this argument, President Al Bashir should
be immune under Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute.'13 The
indictment has been called an attack by the west against Africa, as
the ICC has investigated situations in Africa only.'37 For example,
AU Chairman Jean Ping said "[it] seems Africa has become a
laboratory to test the new international law."138 As discussed in
Part I, however, there are also individuals that believe that
immunity for a head of state does not apply to core crimes.139
The AU also had reservations over the ICC's capability to
handle a situation like Darfur because the ICC cannot conduct a
wide enough prosecution in order to truly bring justice to the
region.140 The ICC is slow, generally prosecutes each individual
132. See Rumbidzai Maweni, Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir Indicted by the
ICC; What's Next, CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS (Jan. 4, 2011), http://
archive2.globalsolutions.org/issues/sudans-president omar hassan al bashir
indicted icc what s next (recognizing that various groups and countries such as the
AU, the International Crisis Group, and the United States expressed concern regarding
the indictment).
133. See id. (reiterating one concern that President Al Bashir's Government will be
less likely to negotiate and participate in peace processes).
134. See id. (contending that even though there was a lot of skepticism, the
referendum appears to be going forward).
135. See id. (noting that President Al Bashir's sympathizers have called the
indictment "an affront to African sovereignty").
136. See id. (examining the more widespread argument for why there is criticism of
the ICC's indictment of President Al Bashir, which is that it is a breach of Sudan's
sovereignty); see also Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 98(1) (describing that the ICC
may not request that a state violates diplomatic immunity of an individual).
137. See Vow to Pursue Sudan over 'Crimes,' BBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 2008), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7639046.stm. (stating that AU Chairman Jean Ping said
that it is "unfair that all those indicted by the ICC so far" are African).
138. Id.
139. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (contending that immunity for heads
of state only applies when the core crimes are not at issue).
140. See AU Peace and Security Council, supra note 12, 1 244-45 (arguing that the
ICC does not have the capability of using a widespread approach to arrests and pointing
out that it is only able to arrest one individual at a time).
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separately, and is concerned with international implications.' 4 '
Therefore, the ICC will not prosecute every responsible
individual and may prosecute some that should not be
prosecuted. 42 Thus, many of those criminally responsible will go
unpunished. 43 Instead, the AU suggests that the proper remedy
is to strengthen Sudan's legal system internally.144 It recommends
that Sudan "draw upon an established and diverse legal heritage,
encompassing common law, customary and Islamic laws" to bring
the region the justice, peace, and healing that it needs.145
Thus, on July 21, 2008, the AU Peace and Security Council
requested that the UN Security Council defer the prosecution
against President Al Bashir for twelve months pursuant to Article
16 of the Rome Statute.'46 The Security Council was not
responsive to the request, as Moreno-Ocampo proceeded with
the prosecution.'47
Disheartened and concerned over the lack of action from
the Security Council, the AU issued a decision to all of its
member states regarding the indictment of President Al Bashir in
July 2009.148 The AU decision expressed regrets that the request
for deferral was ignored and asked the UN Security Council to
reconsider its decision. 49 The AU thus decided that, pursuant to
141. See id. (emphasizing the AU's concerns about the ICC's ability to prosecute
crimes, such as those that occurred in Darfur).
142. See id. (discussing the ICC's limitations).
143. See id. (stating that many crimes will go unpunished because of the ICC's
limitations).
144. See id. 1 18 (claiming that it would be more advantageous for Sudan and the
Sudanese people if the Sudanese Government prosecutes the crimes itself).
145. Id.
146. See id. 1 62 (reporting that the AU requested that the UN defer the
prosecution of President Al Bashir pursuant to the Rome Statute); ICC Urges States to
Assist in Arresting Suspects Including Sudanese Leader, BBC MONITORING: MIDDI.E EAST,
Oct. 30, 2010 (stating that the AU requested that the UN Security Council delay
President Al Bashir's prosecution for one year).
147. See AU Peace and Security Council, supra note 112, 1 242 (reporting that the
AU attempted to ask the UN to defer the prosecution according to the Rome Statute,
but the Council did not reply "positively").
148. See Assembly of the Africa Union, Decision on the Meeting of African States
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Doc.
Assembly/AU/I3(XIII) 1 8 (July 8, 2009) (discussing the AU's concern that the ICC has
not deferred the indictment against President Al Bashir).
149. See id. 1 10 (explaining that the AU regrets that the UN Security Council has
not deferred the proceedings against P'resident Al Bashir and reiterates its request for
deferral to the UN Security Council).
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Article 98 of the Rome Statute, AU member states would not
cooperate with the arrest and surrender of President Al Bashir.o50
D. Conflict between the ICC and the AU
Despite the AU's decision and interpretation of Article 98 of
the Rome Statute, the ICC issued a second warrant for President
Al Bashir's arrest on July 12, 2010.151 The second indictment was
for three counts of genocide.'52 Between the two warrants, he is
accused of five counts of crimes against humanity, two counts of
war crimes, and three counts of genocide for a total ten counts
against him.'53 On July 21, 2010, the ICC issued supplementary
requests to Sudan and to members of the ICC to arrest and
surrender President Al Bashir.15 4
On July 16, 2010, the AU issued a statement in response to
the ICC's indictment of President Al Bashir for genocide.'5 5 The
150. See id. 1 8 (indicating that because the ICC has failed to act on the AU's
request, AU member states are not to participate in the arrest and surrender of the
President of Sudan).
151. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of
Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (july 12, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf (dating the indictmentjuly 12, 2010).
152. See id., at 8 (reporting that President Al Bashir was indicted tinder Article 6 for
genocide by 1) killing, 2) causing serious bodily or mental harm, and 3) deliberately
inflicting on each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group's
physical destruction).
153. See id.; supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (mentioning that President
Al Bashir's first indictment was for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
against members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups).
154. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Supplementary
Request to All States Parties to the Rome Statute for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 (July 21, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc910850.pdf (reiterating the duty of the member states to cooperate with the warrant
to arrest President Al Bashir); see also Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09,
Supplementary Request for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir
to States that were United Nations Security Council Members on 4 March 2009 and Are
Not States Parties to the Rome Statute, at 4-5 (July 21, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc9l1440.pdf (requesting that states cooperate in the surrender
and arrest of Al Bashir pursuant to the Rules); see also Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No.
ICC-02/05-01/09, Supplementary Request to the Republic of the Sudan for the Arrest
and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, at 4-6 (July 21, 2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc911445.pdf (requesting that Sudan arrest and
surrender President Al Bashir in accordance with the rules of the UN).
155. See Press Release, African Union, The Chairperson of the Commission
Expresses Deep Concern about the New Decision of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I on
Sudan and Its Impact on the Ongoing Peace Processes in Sudan, (July 16, 2010),
available at http://reliefweb.int/node/362006.
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AU expressed that the new indictment was issued at a particularly
vulnerable time for Sudan because Sudan is transitioning to
become more peaceful and democratic and the new warrant
could disrupt that peace. 56 The AU worried that the new
indictment would act to disrupt the stability in Sudan and Africa,
generally.'57 The AU again asked the UN Security Council to
defer the prosecution. S8
E. Chad and Kenya's Response to President Al Bashir's Indictment
The ICC issued the second indictment directly before
President Al Bashir's visit to Chad, but Chad did not rescind its
invitation to the Sudanese President and he arrived on July 21,
2010.159 The relationship between Chad and Sudan soured
during the Darfurian conflict.6t o Therefore, when President Al
Bashir traveled to Chad on July 21, 2010, the AU was pleased with
the developments.' 6 ' The ICC, the European Union, Human
Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, however, were
concerned with the events and called on Chad to arrest President
Al Bashir, but Chad refused.162
156. See id. (explaining that Sudan is beginning its democratic transformation and
steps towards peace, reconciliation, and the new warrant is counterproductive to these
positive changes).
157. See id. (indicating that if Sudan becomes instable it will have far reaching
consequences across all of Africa).
158. See id. (urging the UN Security Council "to assume its responsibilities and act
on the call for the deferral of the process initiated" against President Al Bashir).
159. See Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, Case No. ICC02/05-01/09, Second Warrant
of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, (July 12, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf (indicting President Al Bashir for genocide on July
12, 2010); see also Hamilton, supra note I and accompanying text (reporting that
PresidentAl Bashir arrived in Chad on july 2 l, 2010).
160. See AU Peace and Security Council, supra note 112, 1 193 (explicating that
the two countries "accuse[d] each other of supporting and harbouring rebels hostile to
the other").
161. See Press Release, African Union, On the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of
the ICC Informing the UN Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the
Rome Statute about the Presence of President Omar Hassan Al Bashir of the Sudan in
the Territories of the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Kenya (Aug. 29, 2010)
[hereinafter Press Release, African Union, Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the
ICC] (arguing that as a neighbor of Sudan, it is important for Chad to engage Sudan to
ensure peace and stability).
162. See supra note II (referring to the ICC, the European Union, Human Rights
Watch, and Amnesty International's requests that the countries turn President Al Bashir
over to the ICC).
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Then, on August 28, 2010, President Al Bashir traveled to
Kenya, also a member of the ICC.163 The Government of Kenya
invited President Al Bashir to attend a signing ceremony to
honor Kenya's new constitution. 6 4 Once again, the defiant
president was permitted to leave a free man. 165 The Kenyan
Government claimed that it could not arrest President Al Bashir
because it would have been detrimental to the Sudanese peace
process.166 Even if that were unimportant, the AU instructed all
member states not to participate in the arrest and prosecution of
President Al Bashir and, as a member of the AU, Kenya had a
duty to obey.' 67
In reply to the defiance of its members, the ICC filed a
decision regarding President Al Bashir's visit to Chad.'6 8 The ICC
noted that President Al Bashir visited Chad from July 21-23, 2010
and that the arrest warrants against him are outstanding.169 The
ICC found that Chad had a duty under the Rome Statute to
arrest President Al Bashir and, because it did not, the ICC
decided to inform the UN Security Council and the Assembly of
States Parties so that they may "take any action they may deem
163. Julian Borger, Court Censures Commonwealth Chief as Rift Deepens over War Crimes
Suspects: Sharma 'Questions Duty' of States to Hand Over to ICC: Row Began over Kenya Refusal
to Arrest Bashir, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 28, 2010, at 22 (reporting that President
Al Bashir caused an "uproar" by traveling to Kenya, an ICC signatory).
164. See Nairobi, supra note 15, at 11 (arguing that President Al Bashir "tarnished"
Kenya's triumphant day with his visit to the country); see alsojody Clarke, Kenya's Historic
Day Overshadowed by Presence of Sudanese Leader Bashir, IR. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2010, at 9
(declaring that the ceremony celebrating Kenya's new constitution was "overshadowed
by the presence of Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir").
165. See Nairobi, supra note 15, at II (indicating that President Al Bashir was not
arrested on his visit).
166. See id. at II (indicating that the Kenyan Government argued that arresting
President Al Bashir could have affected the Sudanese peace process).
167. See Borger, supra note 163 (claiming that Kenya could not turn President Al
Bashir over to the ICC because the AU "instructed its members to defy the ICC and not
apprehend Sudan's president").
168. See Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Informing the
United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome
Statute about President Omar Al-Bashir's Recent Visit to the Republic of Chad (Aug. 27,
2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc931075.pdf (noting that President Al
Bashir recently visited Chad and Kenya).
169. See id. at 3 (reporting that President Al Bashir visited Chad from July 21-23,
2010 to attend the Sahel-Saharan summit and that the warrants against President Al
Bashir are still outstanding).
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appropriate . . . ."170 On the same day, the ICC issued a similar
decision regarding President Al Bashir's visit to Kenya.1'7 As in
the decision to Chad, the ICC reiterated the duty Kenya had to
arrest President Al Bashir and decided to refer the matter to the
UN Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties.'72
The AU responded to the ICC's decisions regarding Kenya
and Chad and expressed its concern. 73 It reiterated that it
attempted to abide by the Rome Statute by requesting a deferral
of proceedings. 74 But, because Chad and Kenya are neighbors of
Sudan, both countries must do what they can to promote peace
and encourage the government and elected leaders, including
President Al Bashir.17 6 The press release argues that the ICC
placed the AU in a position that furthered its own initiative
without concern for the potentially costly repercussions on the
African states. 76
In September 2010, the President of Kenya announced an
Intergovernmental Authority on Development ("IGAD") special
summit on Sudan to be held in Kenya and he mentioned that
170. See id. at 3 (reciting Chad's obligation to assist in the arrest of President Al
Bashir tinder the Rome Statute and announcing the recourse it is taking in response to
Chad's defiance).
171. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision informing the
United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome
Statute about Omar Al Bashir's Presence in the Territory of the Republic of Kenya, 3
(Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc930979.pdf (indicating that Al
Bashir visited Kenya).
172. See id. at 3 (noting that Kenya had the duty to arrest President Al Bashir tinder
the Rome Statute and deciding to refer the situation to the UN Security Council and the
Assembly of States Parties).
173. See Press Release, African Union, Decision of the lre-Trial Chamber of the
ICC supra note 161, at I (relaying its "deep regret that both the statements and the
decisions grossly ignore and make no reference whatsoever to the obligations of the two
countries" to the AU since Chad and Kenya are members of the AU).
174. See id. (indicating that the AU tried to get a deferral but the ICC did not
respond).
175. See id. (describing the AU's frustration that the ICC has not been receptive to
its request for a deferral and explaining the difficult position that Chad and Kenya are
in as Sudan's neighbors).
176. See id. (arguing the decisions against Chad and Kenya were nothing more than
an attempt to coerce African countries to support the ICC "irrespective of the complex
dynamics on the ground[,] which require a fine balance between peace and justice and,
in this regard, the AU shall oppose any attempt to coerce African Countries to
undermine the common African position").
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President Al Bashir could be invited to attend.177 On October 25,
2010, the ICC requested that Kenya inform the ICC about "any
problem which would impede or prevent the arrest and
surrender" of President Al Bashir should he travel to Kenya a
second time. 78 On October 28, 2010, the Attorney General of
Kenya replied to the ICC explaining that the IGAD meeting
would no longer be in Kenya and, therefore, President Al Bashir
would not be traveling there.179
Other member states seem to be getting around the conflict
of deciding whether or not to arrest President Al Bashir by
openly warning him that they will arrest him should he attempt
to visit.180 The general pattern the member states take is to invite
him to an event and then ask that he not come.18 ' Moreno-
Ocampo argues that this is a positive development because it
renders President Al Bashir more and more isolated.18 2
Despite Moreno-Ocampo's optimism, however, in 2011
President Al Bashir visited two member states of the ICC. He
traveled to Djibouti for the Djibouti President's May 8, 2011,
177. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Prosecution
Notification of Possible Travel to a State Party in the Case of The Prosecutor v Omar Al
Bashir, at 1 9 (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc957405.pdf
(reporting that the President of Kenya announced a second Intergovernmental
Authority on Development ("IGAD") special summit on Sudan in November in Kenya
and the President indicated that President Al Bashir could be invited).
178. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Transmission of the
Reply from the Republic of Kenya, at 3 (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc959475.pdf (quoting the ICC's request).
179. See id. 1 3 (citing the Attorney General of Kenya's statement).
180. See, e.g., Julius Barigaba, We'll Get Bashir, Kony Soon, Says International Criminal
Court, E. AFR. (Nairobi), June 14, 2010, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/
937546/-/pdvbwoz/-/index.html (reporting that Turkey warned Al Bashir that it would
arrest him if he attended an upcoming Islamic Conference to be hosted in Turkey); see
also Sudan's Bashir Unlikely to Attend AU Summit in Uganda, Says Malwal, SUDAN TRIBUNE,
June 9, 2010 http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-Bashir-unlikly-to-attend,35333
(explaining that Uganda invited President Al Bashir to the country to attend the AU
summit but equivocating with an official statement that Al Bashir was not invited and
that other Sudan officials will attend in his stead).
181. See Sudan's Bashir Unlikely to Attend AU Summit in Uganda, Says Malwal, supra
note 180 (quoting an ICC oflicial as saying "[t]he consistent position of all States Parties
to the ICC has been to hand invitations to president Bashir and warn him at the same
time that should he travel to their territory, they would abide by their ICC obligations").
182. See Barigaba, supra note 180 (quoting Moreno-Ocampo as saying "[a] rresting
Bashir is a matter of time .... More and more, President Bashir is isolated.").
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inauguration ceremony.'" Then, on August 7, President Al
Bashir went to Chad for the inauguration ceremony of Chad's
Head of State, Idriss Deby.'" The ICC issued a Decision to the
UN Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the
Rome Statute regarding President Al-Bashir's presence in
Djibouti and asked that they take whatever action they deem
appropriate.' The ICC issued an additional Decision on August
18, 2011, requesting observations about President Al Bashir's
second visit to Chad.'86 The ICC specifically asked that Chad
respond to the charge that it has allowed President Al Bashir into
its country without arresting him on two occasions.'8 7
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCREASED ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS IN THE ICC
The Rome Statute contains weaknesses that make it
vulnerable to misinterpretations and abuse. Part III.A. reviews the
weaknesses in the Rome Statute, particularly applying the case
study of President Al Bashir to illustrate how detrimental specific
provisions are to the ICC. Part III.A. particularly focuses on two
problematic portions of the Rome Statute. The first is the lack of
183. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Informing the
United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute
about Omar Al-Bashir's recent visit to Djibouti, at 3 (May 12, 2011) (explaining that
"according to the media information available, Omar Al Bashir had attended the
inauguration ceremony of Djibouti's President Ismael Omar Guellch on May 8 2011").
184. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Requesting
Observations about Omar Al-Bashir's Recent Visit to the Republic of Chad, at 4 (Aug.
18, 2011) (describing the background of President AI-Bashir's visits to Chad and
explaining that he was there from August seventh through the eighth, 2011 to attend
the inauguration ceremony for Idriss Deby).
185. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Informing the
United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute
about Omar Al-Bashir's recent visit to Djibouti, at 3 (May 12, 2011) (informing the
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute and the UN Security Council of President
Al Bashir's presence in lDjibouti "in order for them to take any action they may deem
appropriate").
186. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Requesting
Observations about Omar Al-Bashir's Recent Visit to the Republic of Chad, at 1 (Aug.
18, 2011).
187. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Requesting
Observations about Omar Al-Bashir's Recent Visit to the Republic of Chad, at 5-6 (Aug.
18, 2011) (stating that there are allegations that President Al Bashir traveled to Chad
twice without being arrested and asking that Chad respond with an explanation for their
failure to comply with the Rome Statute no later than September 9, 2011).
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repercussions in the Rome Statute for member states that are in
breach. The second is the unclear provisions regarding immunity
and excusal to cooperate. Then, Part III.B. offers solutions to
help strengthen the Rome Statute. It particularly addresses the
two problematic provisions outlined in Part III.A. by offering
possible repercussions for member states that are in breach and
suggesting that the provisions regarding immunity and excusal
be clarified.
A. Weaknesses in the Rome Statute
The weaknesses in the Rome Statute are illustrated by the
case study of the ICC's indictment of President Al Bashir.'88 The
Rome Statute allows the prosecutor to indict an individual that 1)
is a national of a member state; 2) commits a crime on the soil of
a member state; or 3) is a national of a non-member state when
the UN Security Council referred the situation to the
prosecutor.189
The UN Security Council referred the Darfur situation to
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, and he indicted President Al Bashir
for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and later for genocide
for President Al Bashir's part in the atrocities that occurred in
Darfur.190 If the UN Security Council had not referred the Darfur
situation to Moreno-Ocampo, the ICC would not have
jurisdiction over President Al Bashir because Sudan is not a
member state of the ICC and President Al Bashir committed the
alleged crimes in Sudan.'91
The ICC has no ability to bring President Al Bashir to The
Hague without the assistance of its member states, and because
Sudan is not a member state, the ICC has more difficulty
arresting him. 192 Under the Rome Statute, the ICC has the ability
to arrest President Al Bashir if he travels to a member state
188. See supra note 14 (noting that without cooperation from Chad and Kenya, or
another member state, the ICC has no ability to arrest P'resident Al Bashir).
189. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 12(2), 13, at II (listing and describing
the ICC's jurisdiction).
190. See supra notes 98, 109-11 and accompanying text (describing the process by
which President Al Bashir was indicted).
191. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, arts. 12, 13, at 11 (explaining the instances
where the ICC does have jurisdiction).
192. See supra note 14 (emphasizing that the ICC cannot arrest President Al Bashir
without member state cooperation).
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because member states are obligated to cooperate with the ICC's
requests.193 The ICC twice requested that all member states arrest
and surrender President Al Bashir.'94
The opportunity to bring the fugitive to justice presented
itself twice:195 the first, when he traveled to Chad and the second
when he went to Kenya. 9 6 Both countries refused to arrest
him.197 Prior to his visit to both countries, the AU issued a
decision to its member states (Chad and Kenya are both AU
members) that insisted that they refuse to comply with the ICC's
indictment of President Al Bashir.'9 8
The AU cited Article 98 of the Rome Statute for justification
that the AU states do not have to comply with the ICC's
request.'99 The AU claimed that under Article 98, President Al
Bashir has immunity as a sitting head of state and, therefore,
cannot be prosecuted. 200 Although the Rome Statute specifies
that heads of state do not have immunity, it does not specify
whether the provision only applies to member states.201 It is
confusing because the Rome Statute includes that there is both
no immunity for heads of state and that there can be diplomatic
immunity under Article 98(1). Additionally, Article 98(2)
provides that states do not have to comply with the ICC when
they have prior agreements. 20 2 Because Chad and Kenya are
members of the AU, they have an agreement with the AU. Chad
and Kenya can argue that because the AU's position conflicts
with the ICC, they do not have to follow the ICC's requests. The
193. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (noting that member states have a
duty to cooperate with ICC arrest warrants).
194. See supra notes 5, 151 and accompanying text (noting that the ICC issued two
warrants for arrest).
195. See supra notes 1, 163 and accompanying text (reporting that President Al
Bashir traveled to Chad and Kenya and neither member state arrested him).
196. See supra notes 1, 163 and accompanying text.
197. See generally supra notes 10, 164-67 (mentioning that President Al Bashir
visited Chad and Kenya).
198. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (citing the AU's decision).
199. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (referring to the AU's reasoning for
its decision).
200. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing the immunity afforded
to a head of state).
201. See Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 27(1), at 18 (explaining that the Rome
Statute does not allow immunity for heads of states or governmental officials).
202. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (laying out the immunities and
excuses member states enjoy under Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute).
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Rome Statute is vague in regard to immunity and leaves its
member states with little certainty and a lot of flexibility.
In addition to the member states having little knowledge as
to whether they must cooperate, the Rome Statute is also largely
silent on repercussions for member states that are in breach of
the Rome Statute.203 The Rome Statute merely says that the
situation will be referred to the UN Security Council, but there is
no further explanation. 204 Even if Chad and Kenya thought they
had the duty to comply with the ICC's requests, the lack of
guidance they received from the Rome Statute made it possible
for them to believe that there would be no consequences upon a
breach. When faced with the choice of refusing to arrest Al
Bashir with no clear repercussions or arresting him and facing
the possibility of further instability in the region and tension
from Sudan, the choice seems obvious.
B. Possible Solutions
As is articulated above, Article 98 causes confusion. Thus,
Article 98 should be amended to indicate specifically what
constitutes immunity and excusal in its provisions. The confusion
is so problematic, however, that member states are using it to
make excuses not to cooperate.205 As discussed above, Chad and
Kenya can claim that President Al Bashir has immunity from
prosecution as a head of state under Article 98(1). Additionally,
as Rome Statute Article 98(2) seems to say, both countries are
excused from cooperating because of their obligations as
members of the AU, which had requested they not cooperate
with President Al Bashir's arrest and surrender to the ICC. Thus,
an amendment is necessary to clarify the priority of the ICC in
the hierarchy of a country's international obligation.
Even when a member state does know that it is breaching
the Rome Statute, however, there is no defined repercussion for
that breach. Therefore, merely amending Article 98 is not
enough. There must be defined repercussions for states that
refuse to cooperate with the ICC's requests. The ICC must create
203. See supra note 59 (emphasizing the sparse section devoted to enforcement
mechanisms in the Rome Statute).
204. See supra note 59 (pointing out the lack of enforcement mechanisms).
205. See supra notes 93, 147 (describing the amendment process and the AU's
reasoning for its decision).
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incentives for States to follow through with their obligations
under the Rome Statute because it has no power without that
cooperation.206
Three possible options for the ICC to adopt as repercussions for
breaching the Rome Statute are: 1) suspension;207 2)
expulsion;208 or 3) United Nations Security Council sanctions.2 09
The ICC could suspend a member state like the OAS did to
Honduras. 210 It is an attractive option, but it would require the
ICC to amend the Rome Statute.21' The situation with Chad and
Kenya is different from that of Honduras. Honduras was
suspended for staging a coup and not for failing to do
something. 212 Further, the terms set by the OAS concerned what
Honduras had to do to be reinstated. 213 Chad and Kenya,
however, would be placed on probation for failing to arrest
President al Bashir, not for something they actively did. This
situation is more difficult because it is hard to know if a member
state is going to breach the Rome Statute again if it has no
opportunity to do so. Therefore, the ICC should suggest that if
the member states do not violate the Rome Statute for a period
of six months or a year they may be reinstated. The attractive
aspect of suspension is that it puts member states on notice that
there is a possible repercussion but it is not permanent and it is
not very severe. It is important to include a repercussion that is
not overly severe because the ICC alienated Africa by only
indicting Africans.2t 4 Thus, the ICC must be careful of punishing
African countries too severely.
206. See supra note 38 (arguing that member state cooperation is important).
207. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (introducing member state
suspension through the example of the OAS).
208. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining expulsion through the
UN Charter).
209. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (defining the process in which a
breach is referred to the UN Security Council).
210. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (stating that Honduras was
suspended by the OAS).
211. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that another international
body has placed a member state on suspension).
212. See supra note 64 (discussing that Honduras was suspended for disrupting
democracy by staging a coup and ousting former President Zelaya).
213. See supra note 64.
214. See supra note 138 (stating that Africa is becoming angry with the ICC because
only Africans have been indicted).
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The option of expulsion is more risky. It again would
require the ICC to amend the Rome Statute. The UN has
expulsion as a possible option for breach of the UN Charter, but
it is extremely difficult to actually expel a country and it is only
used for a continuous breach.215 Expulsion should not be used
on Chad and Kenya solely for the single violation because that is
a very severe repercussion and it is not in the ICC's interest to
lose member states and automatic jurisdiction over their
nationals. The ICC is in a similar position as the UN in regard to
expulsion because it desires the member states to cooperate with
its requests but it does not want to lose members because that
would make it less powerful. It can amend the Rome Statute to
allow for expulsion and require a unanimous vote (excluding the
country being considered for expulsion) from the Assembly of
States Parties in order to expel a member. Simply amending the
Rome Statute and adding expulsion as an option is likely to cause
the member states to think twice before breaching the Rome
Statute.
The third option is UN Security Council sanctions. This
option is appealing because it is already in the Rome Statute and
would not require the ratification of an amendment.216 Under
the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council may do what it deems
appropriate. The ICC did actually request this when President al
Bashir was first indicted and the UN Security Council has not yet
responded.217 The concern with this option is that the states will
not take it seriously and the UN Security Council will not impose
effective sanctions. Further, without specific ramifications the
member states are not likely to be held accountable.
The most attractive option is to amend the Rome Statute to
clarify Articles 98(1) and 98(2) regarding immunity and excusal
from cooperation. Additionally, the Rome Statute should be
amended to include the option to suspend and the option to
expel, but both should be used sparingly. It should be almost
impossible to expel a member state so that only an egregious
breach will call for expulsion. The option of UN Security Council
215. See supra note 70 (explaining that expulsion is described in the UN Charter as
being reserved for continuous breaches of the Charter and it can be vetoed by one
vo tc).
216. See supra note 59 (describing UN Security Council referrals).
217. See supra notes 170, 172 (describing the referral the ICC made regarding Chad
and Kenya to the UN Security Council).
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sanctions does not carry much weight and since the current,
unamended Rome Statute is not very effective, it is not a viable
option.
CONCLUSION
The ICC is in a position that could make it either obsolete
or a viable international court because the recent events in Kenya
and Chad have exposed the cracks existing in the Rome Statute.
The ICC must fill in these cracks in order to move forward as a
legitimate tribunal. Because the ICC has to rely completely upon
its member states in order to enforce its indictments and arrest
warrants, the ICC must have mechanisms at its disposal to force
the member states to enforce the indictments. The ICC should
first amend the Rome Statute to clarify Article 98(1) so that
countries like Chad and Kenya cannot use it as an excuse for
their non-compliance. Additionally, the ICC should adopt one of
three enforcement mechanisms: 1) suspension; 2) expulsion; or
3) referral to the UN Security Council for sanctions. UN Security
Council sanctions are vague and unpersuasive, as is exemplified
by the way Chad and Kenya completely ignored their duties as
ICC signatories. In this particular situation, the best solution is to
modify the Rome Statute to include both suspension and
expulsion so that member states are aware that their breach will
have consequences. Both suspension and expulsion are powerful
tools to place in the Rome Statute as they will give the
enforcement mechanisms legitimacy even if expulsion is never
actually utilized.
